Managing risk in cross-sector R&D collaborations : lessons from an international case study by Couchman, Paul K. & Fulop, Liz
	 	
	
 
This is the published version 
 
Couchman, Paul K. and Fulop, Liz 2004, Managing risk in cross-sector R&D 
collaborations : lessons from an international case study, Prometheus, vol. 
22, no. 2, pp. 151-167. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Available from Deakin Research Online 
 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30035203	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
Reproduced with the kind permission of the copyright owner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright: 2004, Taylor and Francis 
 
 
 
This article was downloaded by: [Deakin University]
On: 27 July 2011, At: 22:51
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Prometheus
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cpro20
Managing Risk in Cross‐sector R&D
Collaborations: Lessons From an
International Case Study
PAUL K. COUCHMAN & LIZ FULOP
Available online: 23 Jan 2007
To cite this article: PAUL K. COUCHMAN & LIZ FULOP (2004): Managing Risk in Cross‐sector R&D
Collaborations: Lessons From an International Case Study, Prometheus, 22:2, 151-167
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0810902042000218346
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-
conditions
This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation
that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any
instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary
sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings,
demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or
indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Prometheus ISSN 0810-9028 print/ISSN 1470-1030 online © 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/0810902042000218346
Prometheus, Vol. 22, No. 2, June 2004
Managing Risk in Cross-sector R&D Collaborations:
Lessons From an International Case Study
PAUL K. COUCHMAN & LIZ FULOP
ABSTRACT Cross-sector collaborations to perform R&D are on the increase, but they do
involve various risks for each of the partners. Project risks in such ventures are explored
through a case study, a successful collaboration involving an Australian Cooperative
Research Centre and Ciba Vision, a division of the Swiss multi-national Novartis. The
analysis examines the project’s success factors and its risks. The reputation of researchers, the
development of mutual trust among the partners, and the importance of credible commitments
made at project initiation are three key factors contributing to the success of commercially
focused R&D collaborations.
Keywords: R&D, collaboration, trust, risk, credible commitments,
commercialization.
Introduction
The incidence of cross-sector collaboration to conduct research is on the increase,
as public sector organizations (particularly universities) seek extra revenue and
companies pursue cost-effective ways of performing R&D. This paper focuses on a
specific form of cross-sector collaboration in Australia, namely the government-
sponsored Cooperative Research Centre (CRC) Program.1 We explore the
management of risk in cross-sector R&D collaboration through a case study from
one of the most successful CRCs in Australia. We examine risk at the project level,
a focus that to date has been largely lacking in the literature on interorganizational
collaboration (IOC). Research on risk in collaborative arrangements is still a
developing area2 and has hardly been touched upon in studies of cross-sector
collaboration.3
The paper begins with the case study, the ‘See3’ Contact Lens Project (hereafter
referred to as the ‘See3’ Project), which is widely considered to be an exemplar of
successful R&D commercialization in a high stake and risk technology. We then
draw on recent contributions to the IOC literature to explore relational risks in
cross-sector collaborations, such as that of the case study, and the role trust and
‘credible commitments’4 play in managing these risks. We conclude by discussing
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152 P. K. Couchman & L. Fulop
how risk and risk-taking are integral to understanding cross-sector collaborations
and identify some critical factors in successful R&D commercialization.
The ‘See3’ Contact Lens Project
Three organizations—the CRC for Eye Research and Technology (CRCERT),
Australia’s major national public sector research agency (CSIRO), and the
company Ciba Vision (CV), which is a division of the Swiss-based multi-national
corporation Novartis AG—were the partners in the ‘See3’ Project. The project
involved collaboration among scientists, engineers, clinicians and other product
development specialists based in four different locations in three countries (see
Figure 1). It was formally initiated in 1992, and the challenge was to create 30-day
continuous wear lenses that would ‘. . . fulfil the desire of patients for immediate
comfort, convenience and excellent vision’.5
The Project Partners
The CRC played a central role in this project. CRCERT had been established as one
of 15 successful applicants in the first round of funding under the CRC Program.
As with other CRCs, CRCERT is a consortium with units from three universities, a
CSIRO division, and two other non-profit research institutes, as depicted in Figure
2. It is one of the largest CRCs in terms of total annual funding and full-time
equivalent research staff.6 It differs from most other CRCs in that it has no partners
from the business sector (a result of the derivative nature of the eye care products
industry in Australia, which is mostly sales focused with few companies involved in
manufacture or R&D), but like all the CRCs in the medical science and technology
sector, its core participants include other medical research institutes. The central
participant in CRCERT is the Cornea and Contact Lens Research Unit (CCLRU)
located in the School of Optometry at the University of New South Wales. The
Figure 1. The collaborating partners in the See3 Project.
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Managing Risk in Cross-sector R&D Collaborations 153
CCLRU has developed an international reputation for contact lens research, most
notably in the field of clinical evaluation. Indeed, the CCLRU has claimed that it is
the largest centre in the world devoted to cornea and contact lens research. The
CRC and the CCLRU have extensive linkages with other research, education and
industry organizations in the eye care field, and their staff play key roles in the
associated international professional and research organizations (e.g. the Inter-
national Society for Contact Lens Research).
CSIRO is a statutory agency of the Commonwealth Government. It is Australia’s
largest R&D organization with over 6,300 employees based at 60 locations
throughout the country,7 and it receives around 13% of the Australian Govern-
ment’s financial support for science and innovation (nearly 50% of Government
funding for the major Commonwealth research agencies).8 In 2000/01, it received
funding of $612.5 million from the Government, and also earned a further $267
million (28% of its total revenue that financial year) from the ‘sale of goods and
services’.9 The particular division that collaborated on the ‘See3’ Project was the
Melbourne-based Division of Chemicals and Polymers (since 1996 it has been part
of a larger Division of Molecular Science). The main focus of this division is to
contribute to the development of industries in the Chemicals and Plastics sector
(47% of the division’s research effort is devoted to this) and the Pharmaceutical
and Human Health sector (43%). As a division, following CSIRO policy and
directions, it has expressed a particular interest in collaborating with external
partners to produce commercializable outcomes.
Ciba Vision (CV) was established in 1980 as a result of diversification by the US
Pharmaceutical Division of the Swiss multi-national Ciba Geigy. In 1996, Ciba Geigy
merged with another Swiss multi-national, Sandoz, to form Novartis AG with its
core business in healthcare, agribusiness, and nutritional products. On receiving
formal approval of the merger in December 1996, CV became the eye care unit of
Novartis. At the time of the case study, CV had two main strategic business units:
Ciba Vision Optics, responsible for contact lens and lens care products and based
Figure 2. Core participants in the CRC for Eye Research and Technology
(CRCERT).
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154 P. K. Couchman & L. Fulop
in Atlanta, GA, USA (also the worldwide headquarters for CV), and Ciba Vision
Opthalmics, responsible for the development and production of ophthalmic
pharmaceuticals based in Bu¨lach, Switzerland. CV was the 27th entrant in the world
contact lens market, and currently it is the world’s second largest contact lens
company with global sales of US$1.1 billion in 2002.10 CV’s rise to industry
prominence has been the result of extensive product innovation (e.g. over the
period 1981–94 it introduced seven new breakthrough contact lenses and lens care
products). It has also expanded through strategic acquisition, e.g. in 2000 it
acquired the US contact lens manufacturer Wesley Jessen (an important player in
the US industry) to become the second largest company in the industry worldwide.
Although CV publicizes its approach of achieving ‘innovation through partner-
ships’,11 the ‘See3’ Project was the first major international cross-sector collabora-
tion entered into by the company.
Project Background
The contact lens industry has grown enormously since the mid-twentieth
century and is now dominated by large multi-national companies such as CV,
Johnson and Johnson, and Bausch and Lomb.12 Although the first practical
contact lenses (made of glass and covering the whole eye) were invented in the
late-nineteenth century, it was not until 1948 that a hard plastic lens (made
from poly [methyl methacrylate], or PMMA) covering only the cornea was
introduced. These lenses could be worn comfortably for 6–10 hours and
provided the desired visual correction after an adaptation period. But the
contact lens industry did not really flourish until the 1970s following the
introduction by Bausch and Lomb of soft ‘hydrogel’ lenses (made from poly
[hydroxyethyl methacrylate] or HEMA) that could be used for daily wear. Soft
lenses are very comfortable and require minimal adaptation, a significant
advantage over the hard PMMA lenses. It has been estimated that nearly 90% of
all contact lens wearers now use soft lenses.13 However, despite their popularity
and advantages, soft lenses do have a number of significant problems including:
they are prone to the build up of deposits which can create discomfort with
extended wear, they are harder to keep clean, they are more difficult to handle,
and they have poor durability.
The success of the hydrogel lenses led to a search for new materials for an
‘extended wear’ contact lens which could be worn continuously for many days
thereby making their use simpler and more convenient. But the development of a
suitable material has been no trivial task because the extended wear lens has to
satisfy stringent design requirements, such as: optical transparency, chemical and
thermal stability, biocompatibility and wettable to tears, appropriate mechanical
properties (e.g. sufficient durability and strength), suitability for mass production
and—most importantly—high oxygen permeability.14 For soft lenses, two main
approaches were initially pursued from the 1980s: the introduction of very thin
HEMA lenses with higher oxygen permeability (e.g. Ciba-Geigy’s ‘Cibathin’ and
Bausch and Lomb’s ‘Soflens O Series’), and high water content hydrogel lenses
(e.g. Johnson and Johnson’s ‘Accuvue’). After the introduction of the first hydrogel
lenses designed for extended wear in the mid-1980s, many wearers began wearing
them for periods of one to three months.15 But this usage mode led to an increased
risk of corneal ulcers16 and the first generation of extended wear contact lenses fell
into disfavour with eyecare practitioners.17
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Managing Risk in Cross-sector R&D Collaborations 155
Given that modified hydrogel lenses had proven to be unsuitable, a search
commenced for new materials and researchers began to focus on combining
hydrogels with silicone-containing polymers that offered the benefit of high oxygen
permeability. The major problem faced in the development of these new materials
was that of achieving an optimum surface chemistry with high biocompatibility and
good wetting characteristics. In the early 1990s all of the major companies were
pursuing this approach (as a regulatory specialist at CV later noted: ‘The early ‘90s
marked the beginnings of a strong commitment and targeted initiatives by industry
to develop 30-night continuous wear [lenses] as a safe and effective vision-
correction option’18), but by the mid-1990s no silicone hydrogel contact lenses
were yet commercially available for extended wear.
The ‘See3’ Project and its Outcomes
The origins of the project to develop the extended wear lens are interesting and
underline the importance of reputation in the initiation of cross-sector collabora-
tive ventures.19 Prior to the project, CV was generally aware of the CCLRU’s clinical
work and of its director Professor Brien Holden, a leading researcher in the field
who had published a seminal study that established the level of oxygen permeability
required of a contact lens to avoid oedema in overnight wear.20 But this awareness
was not sufficient. In the early-1990s, the Head of CV’s R&D and Marketing
activities began reorganizing the company’s research effort by reducing the
number of projects and focusing on a select few. At around the same time, two
people who knew of the fledgling CRC (an ex-employee of the CCLRU and another
acquaintance) suggested to the CV executive that this was a group which had much
to offer the company. As a result, the CV executive met with the CRC’s Director and
an R&D collaboration contract was negotiated. This seven-year contract was signed
in January 1993. Under this contract, the company agreed to provide substantial
funding for the R&D project (initially a sum of 5 million Swiss francs over three
years was committed) and this was to be matched by the CRC with equivalent
resources, largely in-kind contributions of CRC researcher time. The ‘See3’ Project
was set up under the CRC’s Biomaterials Program, and different participants in the
Centre were assigned tasks according to their areas of expertise; e.g. CSIRO was
responsible for surface science work (to create special lens coatings to hold a tear
film and resist fouling) and polymer synthesis, while the CCLRU assumed
responsibility for the clinical trials of the developed products. Parallel R&D and
product development work was also carried out within two units of CV, one in the
USA and the other in Switzerland.
The R&D project was substantial, involving around 100 people working in teams
at four sites. The key tasks of the project were: to develop a contact lens which could
be worn continuously for up to 30 days; to manage the IP created by the project; to
test the effectiveness and safety of the new lens in non-clinical and clinical trials; to
obtain regulatory approval for the final product; and to develop a commercially
viable manufacturing process. The project proceeded as planned and a new
surface-treated material, described by the company as ‘an entirely new revolu-
tionary material’ and ‘. . . the most significant breakthrough in contact lens
material since the introduction of HEMA 25 years ago’21 named ‘lotrafilcon A’ was
invented.22 Patent applications for the new extended wear lenses were first filed in
Germany, Switzerland and the USA in 1995. The development process also involved
extensive non-clinical testing to provide ‘reasonable assurance of the safety’ of the
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156 P. K. Couchman & L. Fulop
new lens prior to clinical trials. This testing, mainly conducted in the laboratory
and using animals as test subjects, involved studies of biocompatibility, physi-
ochemical properties, compatibility with eye-care systems, sterility and stability. On
completion of the non-clinical tests, controlled clinical studies were initiated in a
number of countries. FDA clearance (under the pre-market approval provisions of
medical device regulation in that country) for the daily wear of the lenses was
obtained in 1997, but at this stage they were not marketed in the USA.
CV publicly announced the ‘breakthrough high-oxygen soft contact lens
material’ in November 1998 and indicated that the lenses, branded as ‘Focus Night
and Day’, were to be test marketed in Mexico for continuous wear of up to six
nights.23 In January 1999, the new product was launched in Spain with a limited
release in Australia and New Zealand later that year. The President of CV’s Lens
Business Unit described the launch strategy as follows: ‘Recognizing that
practitioner confidence in the lens must be earned, we are launching the lens for
six-night wear initially in order to give practitioners a chance to experience the lens
and judge its performance on their own. . . . As practitioners fit and evaluate the
lens on a six-night wear basis, we will continue to build on the base of clinical
support . . . for up to 30-night extended wear’.24 A major milestone was achieved in
April 1999 when Focus Night and Day lenses were given ‘CE Mark’ approval by the
European Union thereby enabling the company to market the product as safe for
30-night extended wear throughout Europe.25
The next major hurdle, to open up the important and lucrative US market, was
to obtain FDA approval. A pre-market application was filed with the FDA in March
2001 and that application was amended many times during 2001. To support the
company’s claim for product safety and effectiveness, there was a one year
controlled clinical trial involving 59 investigative sites throughout the USA and
1,395 subjects (a trial claimed by the head of CV’s continuous wear research
programs to be ‘. . . one of the largest prospective contact lens studies conducted
to date in support of safety and effectiveness’26). The results of this trial were
presented to a hearing of the FDA’s Opthalmic Devices Panel in July 2001 where
the application for FDA approval was reviewed. By this stage, it was estimated that
there were around 250,000 wearers of the lens in over 40 countries with about
175,000 patient years of accumulated experience as well as the results of clinical
trials in a number of countries.27 In October 2001, the FDA formally approved the
sale of Focus Night and Day contact lenses in the USA for daily or extended wear
of up to 30 nights continuously but subject to a number of conditions (e.g.
approved labelling, advertising restrictions, a one year follow-up study and a
requirement to report any adverse reactions or defective devices). Shortly
afterwards in November 2001, CV’s main competitor Bausch and Lomb were given
FDA approval for a rival 30-day extended wear product, ‘Purevision’, made from
another patented silicone hydrogel ‘balafilcon A’ with a higher water content
(36%) and a different surface treatment. The Purevision lens had been the first
silicone hydrogel lens offered for sale in the USA, and had been available there for
up to seven days of continuous wear following FDA approval for this less extensive
usage in February 1999.
Assessing the Project Process
This was a large and ambitious project, but one which all of the participants agreed
was highly successful. It was a high stakes project with a potentially high commercial
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Managing Risk in Cross-sector R&D Collaborations 157
pay-off.28 However, like any R&D project it did have significant risks for the
collaborating partners, both collectively and individually, some that affect all forms
of R&D collaboration and others that are specific to cross-sector collaboration.
Briefly, there were four main sources of risk for the project itself and hence to the
partners collectively. Firstly, there are the widely recognized risks associated with
the uncertainties of R&D itself. That is, at the outset of an R&D programme or
project the outcomes can never be predicted with any certainty; for example, the
surface chemistry research for the ‘See3’ Project may not have produced, in the
time available, the required knowledge to develop a viable coating process for the
new lens. Secondly, for a health-care product that falls within the purview of
regulatory regimes, the process of meeting the requirements of government
regulation raises many risks and extends the timeframe between invention and
market introduction (it is noteworthy that there were more than six years between
the patenting of the new lenses and the approval for their extended wear by the
FDA). Pre-clinical and clinical trials can reveal unexpected problems, and the
requirements of regulatory bodies can impose stringent conditions on the
developers of new health-care products. Thirdly, new product development is rarely
conducted in a vacuum and competition is also a source of risk, e.g. competitors
can out-innovate and either pre-empt the launch of a new product or render it
obsolete. In the case of extended wear lenses, competition also comes from
alternative products such as disposable contact lenses and laser surgery to correct
vision impairments. Fourthly, the management of IP entails many risks. The nature
of this type of risk, and the costs involved in pursuing an aggressive IP protection
strategy, was illustrated by the patent infringement litigation commenced by CV
against Bausch and Lomb initially in 1999.29
But not only were there risks common to all partners in the project, each of the
partners faced different types of risk. For CSIRO, as a public sector research agency
committed to enhancing the economic advantage of Australia, there were risks in
forming a close relationship with a Swiss multi-national corporation, including
technology leakage, a dilution of the Australian-focused research effort, and a
transfer of IP that could result in competitive disadvantage to Australian
companies. For the CRC, there was a risk that a failed project (for whatever reason)
would damage the Centre’s international reputation or that by collaborating with
one particular company its independence would be compromised. For the
company, the risks were of a commercial nature, e.g. that the investment did not
provide a return, that the technological development was pre-empted by a
competitor and that the market for extended wear lenses did not materialize. The
relational risks associated with opportunism were high for the company and the
choice of a university partner was strategically significant in attenuating these risks.
Given that the CRC was a key research organization in the global context, with
already valuable intellectual capital, securing this partnership also meant that
competitors were excluded.
Despite risks such as these, the project started with three highly motivated
organizations. Each had more to gain than it could lose from the collaboration: CV
to be first to market and so capture ‘first-mover’ advantages in a highly competitive
industry; CSIRO to gain external revenue, to demonstrate its relevance and to
reinforce its international reputation in specific areas of scientific research; the
CRC to gain external revenue for its R&D programmes and to build on the
reputation of the CCLRU in establishing itself as ‘the leading world institution for
cornea and contact lens research’.30 The CRC, whose non-commercial partners were
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158 P. K. Couchman & L. Fulop
embedded (and indeed were central actors) in international scientific and clinical
networks, provided a suitable vehicle for the establishment of the collaboration.
Through the CRC, the company could gain access to a diverse range of expertise
and resources organized under a single umbrella. The reputations of key personnel
in the CRC (e.g. its Director) and the CSIRO (e.g. individual scientists working in
the field of polymer synthesis) were central to their employing organizations’
desirability as collaborative partners.
According to research team leaders, the success of the project was largely due
to three main factors: the initial commitments made by the partners, the task
organization and the project management approach adopted. Before it formally
commenced, all participants were required to make explicit commitments to the
project. These included: the allocation of resources in accordance with the role and
stake of each of the parties,31 the free sharing of project information with an
explicit commitment to have no secrets or hidden agendas, and the joint
assignation of IP rights resulting from the project. This latter commitment ensured
that, for the CRC and CSIRO, there would be a flow of royalties if the project was
successful thus providing a material return for their participation. Through these
commitments, trust developed between the CRC and its private sector partner, as
discussed below, a result evidenced by the company’s continued collaborative
relationship with the CRC.
A central element of the project’s overall organization was that ‘critical tasks’
(such as polymer synthesis, surface chemistry and clinical assessment) were placed
on ‘parallel tracks’, i.e. were conducted at several sites simultaneously. This was
important in terms of balancing the power relationships in the project by not
allowing any one group to become too central to the process. Phased commitments
ensured that knowledge was shared as the project unfolded. It also created healthy
rivalry. For example, the polymer synthesis laboratory work was carried out
concurrently at CSIRO, CV USA and CV Switzerland; the three teams had the same
goals, but used differing and complementary approaches. This lead to ‘friendly
competition’, with the teams benchmarking each other, and ensured that the
project was rarely brought to a halt because of technical problems at one site. Also,
with different teams working in parallel on the same problem, more options could
be explored and tested in the time available.
From a project management perspective, there was considerable emphasis
placed on fostering communication and on team building among the participants.
This was seen as crucial, given the different communication styles of the
collaborators (e.g. polymer chemists and clinical ophthalmologists) and the
differences in their work environments (most notably between the laboratory-based
work of the scientists and the more structured activities of other specialists such as
product development engineers). Three media were provided to facilitate high
levels of communication and support collaboration among all participants. The
most critical of these was the provision of a secure computer network linking all
members of the project teams and the relevant organizational managers. Access to
project information was via a groupware workspace through which participants
could: email each other, communicate in a synchronous ‘chat’ mode, gain access to
project databases and documentation,32 contribute to ‘bulletin board’ discussion
groups, securely transfer files, and obtain regular project updates. The philosophy
behind this ‘groupware-based’ network was that all participants, across both
disciplines and organizations, could access virtually all project information to
support team integration and contribute to ‘project energy’. Project information
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Managing Risk in Cross-sector R&D Collaborations 159
could be accessed and communication carried out (either synchronously or
asynchronously) at any time through this network, and this feature was considered
to be more consonant with the working style of laboratory scientists. This mode of
communication was augmented with regular teleconferences among the different
teams, held every one or two weeks. A third medium, based on an explicit
recognition of the limitations of electronically mediated communication, was a
series of six-monthly face-to-face project review meetings, held over a three to four
day period at what were seen by the public sector researchers as ‘prestige
locations’.
Risk, Trust and Credible Commitments
Previous studies have emphasized the importance of mutual trust for the success of
IOCs in which relational continuity is important, such as in R&D projects.33 As
Macdonald et al. have put it:34
(Trust) is required to compensate for the deficiency inherent in formal
agreements—basically that, no matter how carefully they are compiled, they
cannot cover every eventuality. So, an unwritten agreement accompanies every
collaboration, by which all parties understand what else is required of them
beyond the formal terms of collaboration. While a collaboration may be
established instantly, the trust, which underlies the success of the collabora-
tion, cannot.
Two inter-related constructs have been invoked in studies of IOC to explain
relational continuity, trust and risk. As noted above, risks35 arise from many sources
in collaborative ventures, but for the individual partners both relationships of
dependence and the possibility of opportunistic behaviour (i.e. one partner in
pursuing its own self-interest acts opportunistically to the detriment of the other
partners) are a source of particular concern. The concept of trust36 has had a long
history in collaboration studies and is seen as a major contributor to risk taking.
Where two or more parties trust each other, they are usually more prepared to
expose themselves to greater risks by making themselves vulnerable to others.
Trusting others carries the risk that such trust may be misplaced and, for some,
trust always carries the possibility of the risk of betrayal.37 It is commonly accepted
that in R&D partnerships, trust encourages risk taking as well as the sharing of
proprietary information, and also mitigates the need for excessive controls in what
is largely an unpredictable and uncertain area. Further, trust reduces the
transaction costs associated with contracting and legal solutions to the formation of
partnerships. Trusting behaviour (which entails expectations of positive out-
comes38) is built on two forms of trust, and each of these is central to the
management of relational risk.
First there is a resilient form of trust—often termed ‘goodwill trust’—
associated with having personal qualities that can be relied on, such as being
equitable, being fair in dealings, having high integrity and standards of conduct,
reciprocating favours, being able to keep confidences, and being selfless.39 Such a
form of trust develops over time through repeated successful encounters and, if
sufficiently strong, can lead to ‘hand-shake’ agreements. In cross-sector collabora-
tions, goodwill trust already exists for academics and other public sector
researchers who have a public reputation as having the virtues associated with
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160 P. K. Couchman & L. Fulop
goodwill trust. It has also been suggested that ‘third parties’ (i.e. those standing
outside the commercial world), such as universities, can become ‘trustees for
agreements’ or act as a ‘custos collaborationis’ for competitors and be entrusted to
protect IP.40 Evidence of public sector partners playing such a role has been found,
for example, in a study of cross-sector collaboration in the German automobile
industry where a research institute acted as a custodian of IP and as an
intermediary between small supplier firms and a large manufacturer.41 In
theorizing why federal laboratories are invited to participate in R&D more often in
joint ventures where there are large numbers of partners, Leyden and Link
contend that the public sector agencies can reduce the partner firms’ monitoring
and transaction costs in the venture by, inter alia, acting in the role of ‘honest
broker’.42 Such a role was exemplified in an Italian case study, where the public
sector agencies played a role in discouraging opportunistic behaviour by private
sector partners in R&D joint ventures.43
Private sector partners have recognized that the relational risks in cross-sector
collaborations have been relatively small in probability and impact. The relational
risk of opportunism is much less of a problem when partners are not market driven
and the relationships are complementary, as in the case of the ‘See3’ Project. Given
their historical lack of a profit focus, as well as their missions and modes of
operation, public sector organizations are far less likely to engage in calculated
strategies and opportunistic behaviour, such as free-riding, capturing a dispropor-
tionate share of the benefits, or appropriating and exploiting proprietary
knowledge of other partners. The reputation value of public sector researchers
affords the private sector a very cheap and effective way of reducing the expensive
transaction costs of managing distrust in high risk ventures while not having to pay
market prices for the cross-sector knowledge generating process.44
Second, a more fragile form of trust—often referred to as ‘competence trust’—
is associated with expertise, know-how, and the ability and capacity to perform
tasks, as distinct from the intention of performance. Again, repeated interactions
between partners build this form of trust. However, in some circumstances, the
reputation of a partner can be a catalyst for entering into a collaboration even
though the partners might not be personally known to each other. In this event,
reputation can be the basis for forming a partnership, as happened in the ‘See3’
Project, but it is not a substitute for competence-based trust because there is always
the chance that a partner might not live up to the reputation. The reputation of
public sector researchers, especially internationally renowned ones such as those
associated with the ‘See3’ Project, pre-dated the collaboration. The collaboration
could have either enhanced or damaged the reputation of the researchers
depending on how the project turned out. Equally though, the researchers could
have failed to deliver on critical phases of the project thus destroying the basis of
competence trust with the other partners and ultimately their research reputations.
That is why partners in R&D collaborations seek out proxies of trust, in the form
of credible commitments, to ensure that the collaboration works and risks are
managed.45
Fear of opportunism, particularly partners appropriating proprietary knowl-
edge, outlearning other partners, and leaking or swapping information with
competitors, create ‘boomerang hazards’ in many R&D collaborative ventures.46
The fear of opportunism creates the need to obtain certain forms of commitment
to ensure relational risks are managed while trust is still developing. Relational risks
can be seen as ‘vulnerability costs’ that organizations need to prepare for as ‘. . . a
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premium for the risk involved in joining the collaboration’.47 These costs derive
from two main sources: (a) structural dependence and (b) information asymmetry.
Structural dependence occurs, for example, when an external research partner is
used for a long period of time and becomes a substitute for in-house capability.
Information asymmetry occurs when one of the partners has less information about
the collaborative venture than the other(s) and hence faces the possibility of
exploitation as a result. This ‘information dominance’ creates an unbalanced
relationship of dependence leading to the possibility that the more vulnerable
partner becomes the victim of opportunistic behaviour. So, a key question here is:
how are such risks managed in cross-sector collaborations, as exemplified by the
case study?
In terms of structural dependence, none of the partners restricted their
research to the ‘See3’ Project, with the CRC and CSIRO continuing to work with
other companies. CV did not stop its in-house research as a result of the
collaboration, but rather used the project to focus its in-house efforts. This was a
project in which the partners were complementary to each other, meaning none
could have achieved the desired outcome without the support of the others. The
partners established common goals at an early stage and this affected how the
project was negotiated. Moreover, the CRC was instrumental in initiating the
collaboration and was not in the traditional role of many researchers when dealing
with large companies. Large companies often see their relationship with public
sector partners in terms of ‘information gifts’, whereby the latter must offer
something interesting in order to attract a commercial commitment. This has been
described as a ‘commercial courtship ritual’, necessary to get industry involved.48
Once they are engaged in an R&D collaboration, large companies usually demand
significant control over the resulting IP. In R&D projects, information asymmetry
is hard to manage in ways that are beneficial to all partners, and much harder if
structural dependence favours one partner considerably more over the others.
Contracts and other formalized agreements are usually used to prevent
proprietary knowledge being exploited. In the ‘See3’ Project, this was achieved
through the joint assignation of IP which meant that all partners were potentially
able to derive monetary benefits on a pro rata basis. But formal arrangements in
R&D partnerships often create fragile forms of trust and can carry onerous costs of
enforcement. In contrast, ‘credible commitments’, which can be of a contractual or
non-contractual nature, can be more successfully deployed to facilitate the sharing
of proprietary knowledge thereby reducing risks of opportunism. These commit-
ments can be used either on their own or in conjunction with contracts, and in the
‘See3’ Project were deployed in creative and comprehensive ways to facilitate both
the sharing and protection of IP. This creativity had much to do with the centrality
of the project to the core business or activity of all partners and to protecting the
competitive advantage of all concerned.49
One form of credible commitment is the establishment of protocols for
information sharing, and this was clearly evident in the ‘See3’ Project; e.g. in the
philosophy of ‘over dissemination’ that was built around a secure network, in the
groupware-based technology giving information access to all participants, and in
the general agreement to share information as openly as possible. Other forms of
credible commitment include, for example, the development of systematic
approaches, which in the ‘See3’ Project involved teams working at separate sites on
different tasks, and phased commitments, which in the ‘See3’ Project entailed
ensuring that knowledge was shared among the teams as the project unfolded.
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Higher level commitments (i.e. those involving more tangible and costly
undertakings) include joint equity in projects, the sharing of royalties, advanced
investments from larger partners made before a project commences, the larger
partner contributing a higher proportion of funds, and specific upfront commit-
ments to the project—nearly all of which occurred in the ‘See3’ Project.
Credible commitments, or acts of ‘pledging’, can lead to spiralling trust based
on ‘self-amplifying reciprocity’,50 which arises as partners build a track record of
successful execution of commitments. This usually leads to further collaboration, as
resulted from the ‘See3’ Project after which CV continued to work with the CRC.
Reciprocity is important in building trust and this entails balancing the power
relationships between collaborating partners. Furthermore, credible commitments
influence the social capital or the quality of collaborative linkages.51 More
importantly, credible commitments are not only ‘proxies of trust’, they also act as
forms of ‘enforceable trust’ by setting the norms of compliance as well as the
sanctions for breaches of agreed commitments.
It is generally acknowledged that cross-sector collaborations are double-edged
swords for all partners, and for public sector researchers the single biggest problem
is that their reputations can become a commodity when traded for research
dollars.52 While the main benefit of R&D collaboration for public sector
organizations is access to extra funding, it does expose them to a range of risks that
have not been widely discussed in studies of IOC, most notably the potential for
damage to academic reputations. Cross-sector collaborations, especially if commer-
cialization is the objective, can significantly alter the trust dynamics that underpin
research and innovation in an academic community. The term ‘intermediated
trust’ has been used to describe the social basis of relationships within research
communities, to which reputation and academic credentialism are fundamental.53
As the social capital of scientific credibility, intermediated trust is considered to be
different to the other forms of trust discussed so far. Scientific communities
develop their knowledge bases, and the associated potential to innovate, from both
formal and informal networking which involves, through gossip and chatting
among researchers, the sharing of privileged and proprietary knowledge, as well as
the exchange of crucial and unpublished information on research (including
current thinking on pressing problems and the foreshadowing of future areas of
research).54 Confidentiality agreements, the commodification of knowledge in the
form of IP and other constraints imposed due to commercialization can
undermine scientific credibility because of the secrecy and exclusivity surrounding
the research findings, as is particularly the case with project agreements which
restrict publication. Studies in the US and Australia have confirmed this trend.55
Conclusions
Given that our research has focused on the level of R&D projects, the case study does
lend support to the notion that credible commitments are important in explaining
successful cross-sector collaboration where commercialization and high-risk projects
are involved. What was remarkable about the ‘See3’ Project was the way in which all
forms of commitment were deployed. None on their own was sufficient to ensure
that relational risks were managed, but we hypothesize that the higher the number of
credible commitments made by the partners in a collaboration the more likely it is to
succeed. We further hypothesize that these commitments will help resolve the issues
of structural dependence and information asymmetry to ensure that relationships of
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trust do emerge. The ‘See3’ Project suggests that developing a typology of credible
commitments, across a range of project types, and linking this to the study of risk will
be invaluable in the growing area of research on R&D collaboration. We believe that
the suite of credible commitments evident in this project are not common and we
want to find out which combinations work better than others. There is a need for
more studies of cross-sector collaborations that comprise multiple projects, with
differing levels of success and partners which can be competitors or complementary
or both, to fully appreciate how risks are managed and to determine whether
credible commitments remain a robust explanation of the success of cross-sector
R&D collaborations. The commercialization and the commodification of knowledge
in cross-sector collaborations not only introduces new forms of commitment, they
also put pressure on the reputations of public sector researchers. We have argued
that credible commitments are likely to become the basis upon which relational risks
are managed and trust relations transformed in cross-sector collaborations driven by
the commercialization imperative.
In the ‘See3’ Project, each partner’s risks were different but, in the context of
their own domains, the risks were high and the benefits of commercialization could
only occur simultaneously for all partners. One of the interesting findings of this
case study was that cross-sector collaborations could damage the reputations of all
involved, if the risks are sufficiently high. Reputation has to be differentiated
among public sector researchers. In the case study, the CRC Director already had
an established reputation and the issue for him was at the very least not to damage
this, as opposed to the problems involved in establishing it. We have yet to fully
explore how the reputations of researchers are enhanced or impeded by cross-
sector collaborations. Our case study also departs from a number of others that
have been published in that it was a public sector agency, the CRC, that sought
private sector collaboration and initiated the project. This facet of the ‘See3’
Project supports other studies which have concluded that it is misleading to treat
public sector researchers as an homogeneous group,56 and it undermines the belief
that the private sector drives the commercialization agenda. However, it also true
that without the ‘barter economy of science’,57 knowledge about the CRC, and
particularly the work of eminent scientists such as Brien Holden, would not have
been in the public domain. Yet the ‘See3’ Project comprised a community of
scientists who already had established international reputations and whose research
needed a commercial partner to succeed. While researcher reputation was a major
factor for CV in entering into the collaboration, the added attraction of having all
the critical external IP needed for the project residing in one research entity
(namely the CRC) made the partnership less risky for all concerned. For the
researchers, the critical mass of knowledge and expertise within the CRC mitigated
the relationship of structural dependency between the public sector organizations
(i.e. the CSIRO and the universities involved with the project) and a large and
wealthy multi-national corporation.
While we have focused our discussion on trust and risk, our case analysis has
also revealed that communication and team building were also critical factors in the
success of the ‘See3’ Project. Also, although we have not elaborated on it in the case
study, the quality of leadership in such collaborations and the role of product
champions requires further examination. We would finally add that other areas of
risk management in R&D projects also need to be investigated to give a more
complete account of why some cross-sector collaborations fail while others
succeed.
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